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1  Introduction
Direct execution of a judgment debt against immovable property – including those 
burdened with mortgage bonds – is permissible in the high court on the condition that 
“where the property sought to be attached is the primary residence of the judgment 
debtor, no writ [of execution] shall be issued unless the court, having considered all 
the relevant circumstances, orders execution against such property.”1
The amended rule is a result of section 26 of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996 and reflects the principle that was established earlier in Jaftha 
v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz with regard to the magistrates’ courts’ execution 
process.2 The housing clause provides as follows:
“(1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing.
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, 
to achieve the progressive realisation of this right.
(3) No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without an order 
of court made after considering all the relevant circumstances. No legislation may permit 
arbitrary evictions.”
To give effect to debtors’ rights under section 26(1), the constitutional court held in 
the Jaftha case that a clerk of the court may no longer grant judgments by default 
against primary residences. Rather, a magistrate must grant the order and may do so 
only after all the relevant circumstances have been considered. The case involved 
insignificant, unsecured debts that were enforced against vulnerable debtors’ state-
subsidised houses. It was therefore not immediately apparent that section 26 would 
apply also in the general context of mortgage bonds being enforced in the high 
courts.3
The supreme court of appeal initially accepted in Standard Bank of South Africa 
Ltd v Saunderson that registrars of the high courts could still grant execution orders 
by default, unless there were allegations regarding the infringement of section 26(1) 
* Postdoctoral Fellow at the South African Research Chair in Property Law, Stellenbosch University.
** Professor of Law and holder of the South African Research Chair in Property Law, Stellenbosch 
University.
1 High Court Rule 46(1)(a)(ii), effective from 24-12-2010; see GG 33689, GN R981 (19-11-2010). Direct 
execution refers to the situation where execution against movables (the normal rule) is bypassed in 
favour of execution against immovable property, as is typical with mortgage foreclosures. See High 
Court Rule 45(1) and s 66(1)(a) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944. 
2 2005 2 SA 140 (CC).
3 It was argued in Van der Walt “Property, social justice and citizenship: property law in post-apartheid 
South Africa” 2008 Stell LR 325 331-332 that the effect of the Jaftha case on “normal” mortgage 
cases should not be “played down”.
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rights, in which case the matter had to be referred to a judge.4 Despite acknowledging 
that section 26(1) could be implicated, the court found it unlikely that the clause 
could ever defeat a mortgagee’s claim.5 Yet, some subsequent cases showed that, 
even in mortgage cases, it sometimes might be necessary to deny the application for 
direct enforcement of creditors’ rights because granting those applications would 
result in the unjustified limitation of debtors’ constitutional rights.6
Despite the Saunderson decision, the High Court Rules were eventually amended 
to ensure judicial oversight over all sale-in-execution cases where judgment debtors’ 
homes are at stake, also if the property was mortgaged.7 Moreover, in Gundwana v 
Steko Development the constitutional court confirmed the constitutional necessity 
for judicial scrutiny of all residential foreclosures in the high courts.8
Based on these developments,9 the question that this article addresses is: what 
does section 26 of the constitution require, on a substantive level, for the valid sale in 
execution of mortgaged homes?10 High Court Rule 46 requires that all the relevant 
circumstances must be considered before an execution order is granted, implying 
that the court must exercise a discretion. Given that the rule was directly inspired 
by the housing clause, the substantive requirements of section 26 must necessarily 
be the basis for the discretion.11
After establishing the constitutional yardstick for a valid sale in execution, it is 
furthermore necessary to evaluate how this new paradigm affects the traditional 
common law of mortgage. Applying section 26 might show that certain forced sales 
that would have been valid under the common law are no longer legitimate under 
the constitution. These instances might be thought to require development of the 
common law so as to bring it into conformity with the spirit, purport and objects 
of the bill of rights.12 However, based on the subsidiarity principles, we argue that 
because there is legislation in place that already gives effect to debtors’ constitutional 
rights, a constitutionally inspired development of the common law is inappropriate 
in these instances. The primary legislative measure that protects and provides relief 
for debtors who are in default due to their over-indebtedness is the National Credit 
Act 34 of 2005.
After extrapolating the scope of section 26 for mortgage foreclosure purposes,13 
we analyse the proportionality test that the clause requires on the basis of case law.14 
We subsequently evaluate the effect of section 26’s proportionality standard on 
4 2006 2 SA 264 (SCA).
5 the Saunderson case (n 4) par 19.
6 Examples are ABSA Bank Ltd v Ntsane 2007 3 SA 554 (T) and Firstrand Bank Ltd v Maleke 2010 1 
SA 143 (GSJ), discussed in sections 3.3 and 4.3 below.
7 See n 1 above.
8 2011 3 SA 608 (CC). For a discussion of the implications of the case, see Van der Walt and Brits “The 
purpose of judicial oversight over the sale in execution of mortgaged property” 2012 THRHR 322. 
However, for criticism, see Juma “Mortgage bonds and the right of access to adequate housing in 
South Africa” 2012 JJS 1.
9 For a summary of how the debate surrounding the impact of s 26 progressed through the cases, see 
Van Heerden “The impact of the right of access to adequate housing on the enforcement of mortgage 
agreements and other credit agreements” 2012 THRHR 632; Du Plessis “Judicial oversight for sales 
in execution of residential property and the National Credit Act” 2012 De Jure 532 and Steyn “‘Safe 
as houses’? – balancing a mortgagee’s security interest with a homeowner’s security of tenure” 2007 
Law Democracy and Development Journal 101.
10 The article does not discuss procedural details.
11 See Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Bekker 2011 6 SA 111 (WCC) par 30.
12 s 39(2) of the constitution.
13 See section 2 below.
14 See section 3 below.
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mortgage foreclosure principles and describe how the common law might not live 
up to the constitution.15 Furthermore, after explaining the subsidiarity principles 
and their application to the National Credit Act,16 we provide an example from 
case law that illustrates the (in our view) correct way of applying the housing 
principles in mortgage foreclosure disputes, namely by exploiting the act’s debt 
relief mechanisms.17 Our goal is to argue that debtors’ section 26 rights should be 
given effect to, not by developing the common law, but by invoking the National 
Credit Act. The act should be viewed as parliament’s primary measure to address 
the negative consequences, including foreclosure and sale in execution of debtors’ 
homes, of over-indebtedness. A development of the common law that duplicates the 
protection already extended by the National Credit Act should not be permissible, 
and therefore debtors (and courts) should not be allowed to bypass the National 
Credit Act and directly rely on the constitutional housing principles. However, as 
will become clear, we argue that the interpretation of the act should be strongly 
informed by the principles and values of the housing clause.
2  Scope of section 26 in mortgage cases
2.1  Section 26(3)
The amended court processes reflect the wording and principle enunciated in section 
26(3) of the constitution: “No one may be evicted from their home, or have their 
home demolished, without an order of court made after considering all the relevant 
circumstances. No legislation may permit arbitrary evictions.”18 On face value, 
section 26(3) only applies to eviction and demolition, but it makes no reference 
to sale in execution. Initially, some courts relied on this fact as the reason why 
section 26(3) does not require judicial oversight in execution cases.19 However, it 
is now generally accepted that the provision should be interpreted broadly so as to 
require judicial scrutiny also at the earlier stage when an execution order is granted. 
15 See section 4 1 below.
16 See section 4.2 below.
17 See section 4.3 below.
18 Similar wording appears in s 66(1)(a) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944, as amended by the 
Jaftha case (n 2), and High Court Rule 46(1)(a)(ii). 
19 Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz 2003 BCLR 1149 (C) 40-46 (the a quo judgment) held that 
evictions and executions are conceptually distinct procedures. Moreover, the court found that the 
debtor’s housing rights will only be limited at the point of eviction, when the Prevention of Illegal 
Eviction from Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (PIE) provides sufficient protection. 
For this reason the court held that s 26(3) does not apply to execution cases. The constitutional court 
rejected the high court’s decision. However, it did not base its judgment expressly on s 26(3) but on 
the fact that the lack of judicial oversight could lead to an unjustified limitation of s 26(1) rights. 
For this reason (the lack of reference to s 26(3) in the Jaftha constitutional court case (n 2)), the 
supreme court of appeal found in the Saunderson case (n 4) par 13-15 that s 26(3) is solely applicable 
if there is an eviction subsequent to sale in execution. See also Kelly-Louw “The right of access 
to adequate housing” 2007 JBL 35 37-38. Nonetheless, the constitutional court’s remedy (reading 
words into the Magistrates’ Courts Act) clearly reflected the wording of s 26(3): see the Bekker case 
(n 11) par 8. Further, as Van Heerden and Boraine “Reading procedure and substance into the basic 
right to security of tenure” 2006 De Jure 319 320-321 comment, the Jaftha a quo court’s distinction 
between eviction and sale in execution was artificial. See also the criticism by Davis and Klare 
“Transformative constitutionalism and the common and customary law” 2010 SAJHR 403 458-460. 
We agree that it would be incorrect to ignore the possibility of eventual eviction when having to 
decide whether to grant the execution order. 
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Especially the constitutional court judgment in the Gundwana case had the effect 
that “the execution process is equated with eviction” for section 26(3) purposes.20
We contend that section 26(3) applies to all procedures that may in the normal 
course of events result in an eviction from a home, even though the order applied for 
is itself not for an eviction.21 Therefore, because an execution order will lead to an 
eviction in the event that the debtor refuses to vacate, section 26(3) must be satisfied 
when an execution order is granted.22 Judicial discretion in deciding an application 
for an execution order will prevent abuses and unjustified violations of debtors’ 
section 26 rights from occurring during this stage already, before a purchaser in 
good faith seeks an eviction order.23 It is clear that the discretion conferred on 
courts by High Court Rule 46(1)(a)(ii) is underscored by the constitutional principle 
in section 26(3) of the constitution.24 Therefore, any order that will likely lead to an 
eviction from a home (like an execution order) should only be granted after all the 
relevant circumstances have been considered.25
2.2  Sections 26(1)
Section 26(3) – and by implication High Court Rule 46 – provides procedural 
safeguards against eviction but does not explain the circumstances that are relevant 
or what the substantive standards are. Hence, one must resort to section 26(1), 
which entails the right that section 26 as a whole is aimed at upholding, namely 
“[e]veryone[’s] … right to have access to adequate housing”. The primary purpose 
of section 26(1), read with section 26(2), is to place a positive duty on the state to 
“take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to 
achieve the progressive realisation of this right”. However, it is accepted that section 
26(1) also involves a negative duty on all persons not to limit someone’s existing 
access to adequate housing.26
Bill of rights litigation involves a two-step approach, according to which the 
claimant must first prove that he is a beneficiary of the right and that it was violated. 
20 See Nedbank Ltd v Fraser 2011 4 SA 363 (GSJ) par 9, with reference to the Gundwana case (n 8) 
par 41. See also Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Snyders 2005 5 SA 610 (C) par 7, 22 and 29 and the Bekker 
case (n 11) par 8.
21 According to s 1 (sv “evict”) of PIE “‘evict’ means to deprive a person of occupation of a building 
or structure, or the land on which such building or structure is erected, against his or her will, and 
‘eviction’ has a corresponding meaning”. Because sale in execution does not deprive a person of 
occupation, it is not an “eviction” for PIE purposes.
22 See also Brits Mortgage Foreclosure under the Constitution  Property, Housing and the National 
Credit Act (2012 thesis Stellenbosch) par 3.3.2.
23 the Fraser case (n 20) par 9 and Changing Tides 17 (Pty) Ltd NO v Erasmus; Changing Tides 17 (Pty) 
Ltd NO v Cleophas; Changing Tides 17 (Pty) Ltd NO v Frederick 12-11-2009 (WCC) (unreported) 
par 7-8.
24 the Bekker case (n 11) par 12-13 and FirstRand Bank Ltd v Folscher 2011 4 SA 314 (GNP) par 34.
25 the Erasmus case (n 23) par 8.
26 Maphango v Aengus Lifestyle Properties (Pty) Ltd 2012 3 SA 531 (CC) par 32; the Jaftha case 
(n 2) par 34; Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) par 46; 
Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) par 34 and Ex parte 
Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly  In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa, 1996 1996 4 SA 744 (CC) par 78. See also Liebenberg “The application of socio-
economic rights to private law” 2008 TSAR 464.
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The defendant may then secondly prove that this violation is justifiable.27 For 
a debtor to rely on section 26, it should consequently first be established that the 
subsection indeed applies to his situation. The creditor must then show why it is 
justified to violate the debtor’s section 26 rights through foreclosure. Before High 
Court Rule 46(1)(a)(ii) was amended, many courts placed significant weight on 
the requirement that debtors should prove a deprivation of their right of “access to 
adequate housing”.28
However, this narrow approach to the ambit of section 26(1) suffers from several 
problems. First, it assumes that section 26(1) is limited only if, as a result of the 
sale, the debtor will have no access to adequate housing, which makes it almost 
impossible to prove a violation. The word “deprive” is sometimes used to describe 
the violation of a fundamental right.29 However, in light of the terminology in the 
limitation clause (section 36), the word “limit” is preferable.30 “Deprive” can lead 
one to assume incorrectly that a right is limited only when the right is taken away 
completely. However, this is not the case, since a right is limited even at the slightest 
interference. “Limit” does not mean that the right is taken away totally, as appears 
from the fact that section 36(1) provides as one if its factors that “the nature and 
extent of the limitation” should be considered – recognition of degrees of limitation 
is implied.31 Therefore, “limit” does not mean a complete removal or eradication of 
a right, although it includes that. Outside of the de minimis principle, any legally 
relevant restriction, violation or interference, no matter its size or extent, in principle 
qualifies as a limitation that must be justified.
In addition, section 26(1) does not provide a right to “adequate housing”. Instead, 
it affords a “right to have access to adequate housing”.32 Consequently, the section 
emphasises the access and not the type of housing. “Access” can be defined as “the 
means or opportunity to approach or enter a place” or “the right or opportunity to 
use something or see someone”.33 Using these definitions, the right in section 26(1) 
can be defined as to have the means, opportunity or right to approach, use or enter 
adequate housing.
27 S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) par 100-102 and S v Zuma 1995 2 SA 642 (CC) 660. This 
approach comes from Canadian law: see Roux and Davis “Property” in Cheadle, Davis and Haysom 
(eds) South African Constitutional Law  The Bill of Rights (re 10, 2011) 20-26, citing the Canadian 
case of R v Oakes (1986) 26 DLR (4th) 200 223-224. In general, see also Woolman and Botha 
“Limitations” in Woolman, Roux and Bishop (eds) II Constitutional Law of South Africa (2006) 
34-18 – 34-29 and Currie and De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (2005) 26 and 165-168.
28 In the Saunderson case (n 4) par 15-20 the supreme court of appeal held that “adequate housing” is 
a fact-based, relative concept. The court introduced a rule of practice that creditors must henceforth 
inform debtors of their rights under s 26(1) and must invite them to present information regarding the 
violation (if any) of these rights. Creditors would therefore not have to justify an execution order in 
advance, but would only have to do so if the debtor can convincingly show that his right to “adequate 
housing” was infringed. See Kelly-Louw “Protection of homeowners against various interest rate 
hikes” 2010 SA Merc LJ 27 44. See also Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Hunkydory Investments 
188 (Pty) Ltd (No 2) 2010 1 SA 634 (WCC) par 29-30; FirstRand Bank Ltd v Meyer 17-02-2011 (ECP) 
(unreported) par 25; Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Hales 2009 3 SA 315 (D) par 25; Changing 
Tides 17 (Pty) Ltd NO v Scholtz 02-02-2010 (ECP) (unreported) par 22-23; First National Bank Ltd v 
Rossouw 06-08-2009 (GNP) (unreported) par 20; ABSA Bank Ltd v Noniki Trading CC, ABSA Bank 
Ltd v Ikroza Enterprise Solutions CC, ABSA Bank Ltd v Hqubela Trading CC 07-04-2011 (ECG) 
(unreported) par 55 and Firstrand Bank Limited v Swarts 01-03-2010 (WCC) (unreported) par 2-3.
29 For example, see the Jaftha case (n 2) par 34 and Van Heerden (n 9) 634, 652 and 653.
30 See also Woolman and Botha (n 27) 34-3 - 34-4.
31 s 36(1)(c).
32 s 26(1) (emphasis added).
33 Soanes and Stevenson Concise Oxford English Dictionary (2006) sv “access”.
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Hence, if the debtor experiences any restriction (or limitation) of his ability, 
means, opportunity or right once again to approach, use or enter (or have access to) 
adequate housing, section 26(1) has been limited. In terms of this wide interpretation 
of section 26(1), the subsection will be infringed whenever an existing home 
(regardless of the type) is lost as a consequence of any legal procedure.34 However, 
during the section 36(1) justification stage the debtor must still provide information 
concerning the extent of the violation. The reason for this is that, because there is 
a mortgage registered over the property, the general justification of the sale can 
be accepted prima facie. Regardless of the fact that section 26(1) is assumed to be 
limited, in the absence of special circumstances, courts will generally be entitled to 
assume that the limitation of the section 26(1) right is justified under the limitation 
clause. As the court in Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Bekker explained:
“[I]n the absence of unusual circumstances, or an abuse of process, execution against hypothecated 
property which is the home of the mortgagor is prima facie constitutionally justifiable, even if its 
effect would be to infringe the judgment debtor’s section 26 rights.”
35
The purpose of the discretion under High Court Rule 46 is thus to evaluate whether 
the violation of section 26(1) is justifiable in terms of the principles in section 36(1) 
of the constitution. The degree to which the debtor’s access to adequate housing 
is limited will then influence the justification enquiry under section 36(1), which 
provides that a right in the Bill may be limited only “to the extent that the limitation 
is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom”. The clause lists five non-exhaustive factors: “(a) the 
nature of the right; (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature 
and extent of the limitation; (d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; 
and (e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose”.36
Regarding the nature of the right, few will deny that section 26 contains a right 
“vital to our constitutional democracy”,37 also because the home is intricately 
linked to occupiers’ dignity.38 In essence, section 36 requires that the impact of 
the infringement must be proportionate to the purpose thereof, hence requiring a 
34 Conversely, see Van Heerden (n 9) 653-654.
35 the Bekker case (n 11) par 17 (original italics). See also par 13. The court relied on the endorsement 
by the Gundwana case (n 8) par 47 of the Jaftha case (n 2) par 58. In Absa Bank Ltd v Petersen 
2013 1 SA 481 (WCC) par 37 the court held that, in the mortgage context, the debtor’s “right to 
ownership of his or her home must, in general, yield to the mortgagee’s right to realise its security”. 
The only exception to this premise is when “the exercise of the mortgagee’s right is in bad faith”. 
If the creditor claims execution under circumstances where it is clear that the judgment debt can be 
satisfied in another reasonable manner (one that does not involve the loss of the home), this would 
be an indication of bad faith. In view of the importance of mortgage finance for the acquisition of 
homes, the court confirmed that public policy dictates the enforcement of mortgages, unless such 
enforcement is sought in bad faith. See also the Fraser case (n 20) discussed in section 3.4 below.
36 s 36(1)(a)-(e) of the constitution. For an analysis of the five factors, see Woolman and Botha (n 27) 
34-70 – 34-92 and Currie and De Waal (n 27) 176-185.
37 Woolman and Botha (n 27) 34-72.
38 s 10 of the constitution. See the Ntsane case (n 6) par 83; the Jaftha case (n 2) par 21 and Port 
Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) par 10, 12, 15, 17, 18, 29, 41 and 
42. See also Liebenberg “The value of human dignity in interpreting socio-economic rights” 2005 
SAJHR 1 and Chaskalson “Human dignity as a foundational value of our constitutional order” 2000 
SAJHR 193.
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strict proportionality test.39 Therefore, in view of the importance of the right, 
the test requires a proportionate relationship between factors (b) and (c), in other 
words, between the purpose of the violation40 and the impact it has on the individual 
homeowner.41 Factor (d) requires that the means used to achieve the objective must 
be rationally connected to or reasonably capable of achieving that purpose.42 The 
relationship should also display proportionality and causality.43
Factor (e) indicates that a limitation should probably not be allowed if there are 
alternative measures available that will be less invasive but will still achieve the 
same purpose.44 This is probably the central element of the proportionality test, the 
one on which most limitations will stand or fall.45 If there is another reasonable way 
to achieve the creditor’s purpose without having to sell the home, selling the home 
would not be a justifiable solution. Below we discuss some of the most important 
cases that developed the principles surrounding the proportionality test in sale-in-
execution cases. It is henceforth no longer necessary to debate whether section 26(1) 
and (3) are implicated, but it is preferable to assume that foreclosure and sale in 
execution result in a limitation of the right of “access to adequate housing” and 
subsequently focus on the proportionality of this limitation in individual cases.46
3  The proportionality test applied in case law
3.1  General
The abuse-of-process qualification has become one of the main principles that 
section 26 has brought about in the mortgage context. However, this principle not 
39 For authority that a proportionality test is required, see the Makwanyane case (n 27) par 149; 
National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 1 SA 6 (CC) par 33; S v 
Manamela (Director-General of Justice Intervening) 2000 3 SA 1 (CC) par 32; S v Bhulwana 1996 
1 SA 388 (CC) par 18; and S v Mbatha 1996 2 SA 464 (CC) par 14. See also Woolman and Botha (n 
27) 34-69 – 34-70; Currie and De Waal (n 27) 176-178. In the current context, the strongest authority 
is the Gundwana case (n 8) par 54 and the Jaftha case (n 2) par 36 and 40-42.
40 The enforcement of valid contractual debts, even against residential property, is a legitimate 
public purpose. However, although it is rational to enforce validly registered mortgage bonds, the 
proportionality test requires that this purpose must be measured against the impact of the violation 
in individual cases. See the Gundwana case (n 8) par 53-54.
41 It would be helpful to find guidelines that will indicate the degree to which the s 26(1) right is 
limited. Before the court delivered its decision in the Saunderson case (n 4) and in a response to the 
constitutional court decision in the Jaftha case (n 2), Van Heerden and Boraine (n 19) 345 suggested 
that one should ask, “to what extent will execution render them homeless and without the possibility 
of obtaining a house/shelter again?” We support this submission because it simplifies the matter to 
the basic problem, namely homelessness. Whether alternative accommodation is readily available 
will indicate the extent to which the debtor will or will not have access to new adequate housing. 
For example, in the Noniki case (n 28) par 57-59, the court granted the execution order because the 
debtor did not allege that he had no ability to find substitute adequate housing. Neither did he explain 
why other adequate housing could not replace his current residence. Also, in First Rand Bank Ltd v 
Noroodien 14-11-2011 (WCC) (unreported) par 19 the court considered the fact that there would be 
enough of a surplus available to the debtors (after the proceeds of the auction had been used to settle 
the debt) with which they could acquire accommodation elsewhere.
42 Woolman and Botha (n 27) 34-84.
43 Currie and De Waal (n 27) 183.
44 See also Standard Bank of South Africa v Molwantwa 05-05-2011 (GNP) (unreported) par 12.
45 Currie and De Waal (n 27) 183-184. Bilchitz “How should rights be limited” 2011 TSAR 568 575 
argues that “[b]y not considering properly the availability of less restrictive means … [one] … 
ultimately fails to apply a real proportionality test”.
46 For example, in the Noniki case (n 28) par 57 the court assumed that the sale in execution limits 
s 26(1) rights and based its decision on whether such a limitation was justifiable in the case at hand.
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only entails a prohibition against procedural abuses, irregularities and ulterior 
motives. Rather, as the court explained in FirstRand Bank Ltd v Folscher,
“the creditor’s conduct need not be wilfully dishonest or vexatious to constitute an abuse. The 
consequences of intended writs against hypothecated properties, although bona fide, may be 
iniquitous because the debtor will lose his home while alternative modes of satisfying the creditor’s 
demands might exist that would not cause any significant prejudice to the creditor.”
47
The court also held that a comparison must be drawn between the “proportionality 
of prejudice that the creditor might suffer if execution were to be refused” and 
the “prejudice the debtor would suffer if execution went ahead and he lost his 
home”.48
In 2011 the constitutional court confirmed in the Gundwana case that a mortgage 
bond – although agreed upon and registered against the mortgagor’s immovable 
property (the “voluntary placing-at-risk argument”) – does not entitle the creditor to 
enforce execution in bad faith. A mortgage agreement does not entail a waiver of the 
debtor’s rights under section 26(1) and (3) either.49 The constitutional court reiterated 
that courts should guard against disproportionality and that “due regard should be 
taken” of how sale in execution will affect the poor and those facing homelessness.50 
Courts should be particularly attentive when there is “disproportionality between 
the means used in the execution process to exact payment of the judgment debt, 
compared to other available means to attain the same purpose”.51 The court also 
focused on the availability of reasonable alternatives, which should be considered 
before an execution order is granted against a home.52 Except for these cautions, the 
court emphasised that execution against homes is generally acceptable and a normal 
feature of economic life.53
In what follows we discuss three decisions that applied the housing clause in 
sale-in-execution disputes. The case discussions are not comprehensive but focus 
on the courts’ definition and application of the proportionality test and the abuse-of-
process qualification under the respective circumstances of each case.
3.2  The Jaftha case
After accepting that sale in execution is a measure that can limit a debtor’s existing 
access to adequate housing,54 the constitutional court held that the fact that a 
judgment debt was very small (“trifling”) is a relevant consideration when doing 
the justification test.55 The two homeowners involved in the case had concluded 
unsecured loans of only R50 and R190 respectively.56 Therefore, the case 
concerned the constitutionality of the subsequent sale of their homes to execute 
these insignificant, unsecured debts. Judicial oversight was introduced to prevent 
the abuse of process that is inherent in these kinds of situations.
47 (n 24) par 40.
48 the Folscher case (n 24) par 41.
49 the Gundwana case (n 8) par 44 and 47-48.
50 the Gundwana case (n 8) par 53.
51 the Gundwana case (n 8) par 54.
52 the Gundwana case (n 8) par 53.
53 the Gundwana case (n 8) par 53.
54 the Jaftha case (n 2) par 34. 
55 the Jaftha case (n 2) par 35. 
56 For the facts, see the Jaftha a quo case (n 19) par 2-10, 15 and 23-25 and the Jaftha constitutional 
court case (n 2) par 2-5. 
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The court found that, as part of its duty to test the limitation of their section 26(1) 
rights, “the nature of the right and the nature and extent of the limitation are of great 
importance when weighed against the importance of the purpose of the limitation”.57 
The court acknowledged the importance of the purpose of the limitation that the 
execution imposes on debtors’ rights, but held that this importance is diminished 
in comparison to the nature of the debt: “It is difficult to see how the collection of 
trifling debts in this case can be sufficiently compelling to allow existing access to 
adequate housing to be totally eradicated, possibly permanently, especially where 
other methods exist to enable recovery of the debt.”58 The court qualified this 
statement by highlighting that it will not always be unjustifiable to satisfy a trifling 
debt through sale in execution, since “trifling debt” cannot easily be defined in the 
abstract.59 There may also be other factors indicating that a particular sale will be 
justifiable.60 Because creditors’ interests should not be ignored, there may be cases 
where, regardless of the small amount being claimed, “the creditor’s advantage in 
execution outweighs the harm caused to the debtor”.61
On the other hand, there could be instances where a sale will be unjustifiable 
“because the advantage that attaches to a creditor who seeks execution will be 
far outweighed by the immense prejudice and hardship caused to the debtor”.62 
Moreover, as the procedure stood, unscrupulous creditors could abuse the system by 
taking advantage of the lack of knowledge and information of vulnerable debtors, 
knowing that there was no judicial oversight to check their actions.63 They could go 
ahead with their actions despite knowing that the result would be disproportionate.
The constitutional court held that any remedy should be flexible enough to take 
account of varying circumstances.64 Courts should accordingly take “cognisance 
of the plight of a debtor who stands to lose his or her security of tenure”.65 However, 
there must also be sensitivity towards the interests of creditors and appreciation 
for the “need for poor communities to take financial responsibility for owning a 
home”.66 The court agreed that introducing judicial oversight was the appropriate 
way to prevent the unjustified infringements of debtors’ rights. To assist courts in 
exercising their discretion, the constitutional court gave some guidelines.67 First, 
if the debt can be paid in other reasonable ways, a sale of the home will normally 
not be desirable. However, if there are no alternatives, execution should be allowed 
unless a sale would be grossly disproportionate under the circumstances. This 
kind of disproportionality will exist if “the interests of the judgment creditor in 
obtaining payment are significantly less than the interests of the judgment debtor 
in security of tenure in his or her home, particularly if the sale of the home is 
likely to render the judgment debtor and his or her family completely homeless”.68 
Therefore, the size of the debt will be relevant and it might be unjustifiable to limit 
57 the Jaftha case (n 2) par 36.
58 the Jaftha case (n 2) par 40. For a summary of the purpose, namely the efficient enforcement of debt 
as well as facilitating home loans, see par 37-38.
59 the Jaftha case (n 2) par 38.
60 the Jaftha case (n 2) par 41.
61 the Jaftha case (n 2) par 42.
62 the Jaftha case (n 2) par 43.
63 the Jaftha case (n 2) par 43.
64 the Jaftha case (n 2) par 53.
65 the Jaftha case (n 2) par 53.
66 the Jaftha case (n 2) par 53. There is also “a widely recognised legal and social value … in debtors 
meeting the debts that they incur” (par 57).
67 the Jaftha case (n 2) par 56.
68 the Jaftha case (n 2) par 56.
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a person’s section 26(1) rights if the debt is “trifling in amount and significance” to 
the creditor.69 Much will depend on the circumstances of each case.70
Although the Jaftha case did not concern debts that were secured by mortgage 
bonds, the court emphasised the necessity to take account of “the circumstances 
in which the debt arose”.71 The constitutional court held that if the house was 
burdened as security for the debt, execution should normally be allowed, with the 
exception that abuses of the procedure must not be tolerated.72 Consequently, the 
court acknowledged the “need to ensure that homes may be used by people to raise 
capital” but confirmed an abuse-of-process qualification on mortgagees’ rights.73 
Furthermore, courts should consider whether there are alternatives available that 
might lead to debt recovery while at the same time not requiring the loss of a 
home.74
With regard to finding the correct balance, the constitutional court commented 
that it “should not be seen as an all or nothing process”.75 It is not a case of execution 
either going ahead or the creditor not being allowed to claim repayment. Instead, 
“creative alternatives” should be sought so that the debt can be recovered but 
execution is used only as a last resort.76
The Jaftha case is a ground-breaking decision and it is still the leading case when 
dealing with sale in execution of homes. The constitutional court firmly established 
that solutions should be context sensitive and that court oversight must entail a 
strict proportionality test that balances the legitimate purpose of execution with the 
social and economic effects on homeowners. This case-by-case scrutiny can only be 
conducted by a judicial officer who has all the relevant circumstances before him. 
However, the full impact of the Jaftha case and section 26 was not immediately 
appreciated.
Although the position that was taken in the Jaftha case only had direct application 
in the magistrates’ courts process with reference to unsecured debts, the question 
soon arose whether the Jaftha case had implications for “normal” mortgage cases 
before the high courts. In the Saunderson case the supreme court of appeal accepted 
the constitutional court’s comments with regard to not allowing execution where 
there is abuse of process.77 However, the facts did not seem to reflect the kind of 
abusive behaviour that occurred in the Jaftha case seeing as the case concerned a 
typical mortgage foreclosure. The supreme court of appeal regarded it as unlikely 
that section 26(1) will ever lead to a mortgagee not being able to execute against 
the hypothecated property.78 Therefore, even though the court recognised that, 
in principle, the abuse-of-process qualification could avert execution, it did not 
perceive a strong possibility of finding disproportionality on a substantive level – 
not of the kind that would amount to an unjustifiable limitation of section 26(1).79 
69 the Jaftha case (n 2) par 57.
70 the Jaftha case (n 2) par 57.
71 the Jaftha case (n 2) par 58.
72 the Jaftha case (n 2) par 57.
73 the Jaftha case (n 2) par 57.
74 the Jaftha case (n 2) par 59.
75 the Jaftha case (n 2) par 59.
76 the Jaftha case (n 2) par 59.
77 the Saunderson case (n 4) par 19.
78 the Saunderson case (n 4) par 19.
79 The supreme court of appeal did introduce a new rule of practice that obliges mortgagees to include 
in their summons a warning that foreclosure might lead to a violation of the debtor’s s 26(1) rights, 
inviting the debtor to present information in this regard to the court. Nonetheless, the creditor would 
not have to justify execution in advance. See the Saunderson case (n 4) par 24-25.
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However, it soon became apparent that some mortgage cases would not be as simple 
as the supreme court of appeal assumed they would be.
3.3  The Ntsane case
What distinguishes ABSA Bank Ltd v Ntsane80 from the Jaftha case is that the former 
concerned a debt secured by a mortgage. The case showed that the supreme court 
of appeal’s assumption in Saunderson regarding section 26(1)’s limited influence 
was over optimistic and that, even in mortgage cases, facts can arise that may 
indicate abuse of process and/or disproportionality worthy of court intervention.81 
Significantly, the court also had to face the implications of section 26 for the 
enforcement of acceleration clauses, which neither the Jaftha nor the Saunderson 
case addressed.
Over the years, the debtors in the Ntsane case had often fallen into arrears with 
their monthly mortgage payments and had made several arrangements with the 
bank.82 They continuously struggled to keep up with instalments but periodically 
brought the arrears up to date, after which they would default again.83 After being 
repeatedly warned that the bank would take legal action and after summons had 
eventually been issued, they brought the arrears down to R18.46 – the amount on the 
day of the foreclosure application.84 The bank had applied for default judgment to the 
value of R62 042.43, which was the outstanding principal sum under the mortgage 
loan.85 The bank’s claim was based on the debtors’ default, which triggered the 
bank’s rights under the acceleration clause.86
It was clear to the court that the bank wanted to deprive the debtors of their home 
under circumstances where the amount in arrears was “piffling” in comparison to 
the status of the bank.87 However, the court gave the bank the benefit of the doubt 
and supposed that it would not have foreclosed the bond if the sum in arrears at the 
time was only R18.46.88 The amount on that date was not provided but it seemed that 
the debtors had gone to immense effort to bring down the arrears.89 The bank did 
not explain why it insisted on continuing to exercise its rights under the bond.90
The court’s first impression was that the bank’s decision to foreclose was “morally 
and ethically questionable”.91 It was disquieted by the “irreversible prejudice” that 
the debtors would experience as a result of the bank’s reliance on “the non-payment 
of a minute amount to enforce its claim”.92 The crux of the bank’s case was its rights 
in terms of the mortgage bond, as affirmed in the Saunderson case.93 However, 
the court’s intuition was that, under the circumstances, “it would be unfair and a 
striking injustice to deprive apparently poor persons of their only dwelling”.94 The 
80 (n 6).
81 See Steyn (n 9) 112.
82 the Ntsane case (n 6) par 39.
83 the Ntsane case (n 6) par 42.
84 the Ntsane case (n 6) par 12, 14 and 39-40.
85 the Ntsane case (n 6) par 6 and 15.
86 the Ntsane case (n 6) par 8.
87 the Ntsane case (n 6) par 18.
88 the Ntsane case (n 6) par 19.
89 the Ntsane case (n 6) par 19-20.
90 the Ntsane case (n 6) par 21.
91 the Ntsane case (n 6) par 22.
92 the Ntsane case (n 6) par 22.
93 the Ntsane case (n 6) par 23.
94 the Ntsane case (n 6) par 24.
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court accordingly “found the apparent hard-heartedness … difficult to accept” and 
reserved judgment.95 It was the court’s instinct that it could not allow foreclosure, 
but the exact basis upon which the creditor’s claim could be denied had to be 
established.
Despite the debtors’ recurring default, the bank could not prove that it had suffered 
any loss on the transaction.96 The bank’s attorney nevertheless argued that, after 
doing everything possible to accommodate the debtors, foreclosure was the bank’s 
last resort and therefore justifiable.97 The court in the Ntsane case commented that 
the courts in neither the Jaftha nor Saunderson case had to address the question as 
to “whether the [bank’s] decision to accelerate the repayment of the full amount of 
the outstanding liability under the bond upon default of payment of one or more 
instalments could be set aside or reviewed”.98 The court acknowledged that there 
could hardly be a ground upon which the bank’s decision to accelerate repayment 
can be held to be unlawful.99 At most, it could postpone execution so that alternative 
ways of paying the debt could be sought.100 However, cases like these require a 
weighing up of the bank’s “right to commercial activity and the right to enforce 
agreements lawfully entered into” and the debtors’ “right to adequate housing”.101 
Regarding the test, the court held that “the proportionality of the harm must be 
considered that may befall the defendants if judgment is granted. It must be weighed 
against the harm plaintiff may suffer if the agreement underlying the registration of 
the mortgage bond is rendered commercially ineffective.”102
Furthermore, the court held that it should ask the creditor why the amount in 
arrears cannot be enforced against other assets, and with respect to the abuse-of-
process notion, the court stated the following:
“Even if the bond provides for acceleration of the bond upon non-payment, the Court is entitled to 
refuse to grant execution against an immovable property where the result is so seemingly iniquitous 
or unfair to the house owner that the enforcement of the full rights to execution would amount to an 
abuse of the system.”
103
Furthermore, under the circumstances it would violate section 26 to terminate the 
debtors’ right to adequate housing by enforcing the bank’s right to execute against 
their home.104 It was seen as a “gross unfairness” to allow a sale that would obtain 
a price lower than the market value, whereas a private sale could obtain a price 
that might leave them with some money after the bank’s claim had been settled.105 
Hence, where there are “easier ways to obtain payment of the arrears without any 
prejudice to the [bank’s] rights”, it would amount to an “abuse of the system and 
the processes” if the court were to enforce the bank’s right to execute against the 
95 the Ntsane case (n 6) par 25.
96 the Ntsane case (n 6) par 44.
97 the Ntsane case (n 6) par 47.
98 the Ntsane case (n 6) par 67.
99 the Ntsane case (n 6) par 68.
100 the Ntsane case (n 6) par 69.
101 the Ntsane case (n 6) par 71.
102 the Ntsane case (n 6) par 72.
103 the Ntsane case (n 6) par 79. 
104 the Ntsane case (n 6) par 82.
105 the Ntsane case (n 6) par 84. Conversely, see the Petersen case (n 35) par 38, where the court did not 
deem it to be relevant that the forced sale would realise a price lower than a private sale would. 
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immovable property.106 Pertaining to the violation of section 26, the court provided 
the following guideline:
“[W]henever a bondholder calls up the bond, or seeks an order declaring the bonded property specially 
executable, while the amount in arrears at date of application for judgment is so small that it should 
readily be capable of settlement by execution against movable assets, taking all circumstances into 
account, the declaration of the immovable property as executable would constitute an infringement 
of the debtor’s fundamental right to adequate housing.”
107
Based on this principle the court felt compelled to deny the bank’s application until 
it could persuade the court that there was no reasonable alternative.108 Moreover, 
even if it was mistaken in regarding the bank’s action as an infringement of the 
debtors’ rights under section 26(1), the court could still not grant default judgment. 
The reason for this was that execution against immovable property would have 
amounted to “a prima facie abuse of the right to claim an outstanding amount that 
can be easily obtained by way of execution against movable assets”.109 Consequently, 
instead of granting an order for the full amount claimed, the court issued a judgment 
for the arrears of R18.46 together with interest.110
The Ntsane case opened a new avenue for courts when analysing the proportionality 
of foreclosure cases. Courts should ask whether the enforcement of the acceleration 
clause can be upheld in view of the size of the amount upon which such decision 
to accelerate repayment of the full outstanding balance is based. Accordingly, in 
addition to the size of the full outstanding debt, the court may also look at the size 
of the actual amount in arrears when determining whether the impact of foreclosure 
would be proportionate.111 However, this focus of the court on the actual arrears 
(and interference with the enforcement of the acceleration clause) has been criticised 
on the basis of the traditional principles of acceleration and foreclosure. After 
describing the general observations in Nedbank Ltd v Fraser regarding the impact 
of section 26,112 we explain the Fraser court’s criticism of the Ntsane approach and 
subsequently we comment on the debate.
106 the Ntsane case (n 6) par 85.
107 the Ntsane case (n 6) par 86.
108 the Ntsane case (n 6) par 87-88.
109 the Ntsane case (n 6) par 91.
110 the Ntsane case (n 6) par 94.
111 As appears from the quotes in the main text, the court emphasised the need for banks first to try 
to collect the arrears by having the debtors’ movable assets sold in execution. If this approach is 
accepted as a general principle, it would amount to a development of the common law of mortgage, 
which traditionally entails a right of direct execution against the hypothecated home in the case of 
foreclosure. As we explain in section 4.1 below, in view of the housing clause, this development of 
the common law seems necessary. However, as we argue in section 4.2 below, the National Credit 
Act’s debt relief measures render development of the common law not only unnecessary but also 
inappropriate in light of the subsidiarity principles. Although we agree with the general approach 
in the Ntsane case, namely that foreclosure should not go ahead if the arrears can be rectified in 
alternative ways, we suggest that these alternatives should be found in the National Credit Act and 
not in a separate development of the common law that would seek the same goal but bypass the act.
112 (n 20).
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3.4  The Fraser case
3.4.1  Social values
The Fraser case concerned the circumstances that ought to be considered before a 
court can declare mortgaged homes executable.113 The court sought to give content 
to the requirements of the amended High Court Rule 46 and its endorsement in 
the Gundwana case.114 It emphasised the importance of considering the “context 
and purpose” of the judicial oversight that section 26(3) requires, since this would 
be “a useful lens” through which to analyse the circumstances that are relevant 
in individual cases.115 The court described the context of judicial oversight as “an 
apparent tension between two competing social values”.116 The one value relates 
to the “need for people to be housed and the value of having a home”.117 People’s 
security of tenure and homes must be protected to give effect to this value, which 
finds expression in section 26 of the constitution.118
The other social value, which is equally compelling, is that of enforcing contracts 
and discharging debts.119 This value is promoted by court structures that provide 
persons with ways to enforce valid contracts and execute debts. However, the right 
to execute debts is not absolute and has its limitations.120 Certain assets are, for 
example, already excluded from the execution process.121 Nonetheless, residential 
properties are not exempt.122 The court held that, on an individual level, the creditor’s 
right to execute its judgment “will enjoy relative primacy” above the debtor’s 
housing interests.123 Otherwise, legitimate claims for the repayment of debts would 
be defeated by debtors who rely on section 26.124
The court also found that “the two social values are not so much juxtaposed as 
symbiotic”125 – they are not complete opposites but exist together and complement 
each other. Protecting the social value of execution promotes the social value of 
housing instead of diminishing it, although it may not appear so in individual 
cases.126 Therefore, the argument goes, allowing creditors to execute their debts 
against houses facilitates credit and promotes home ownership.127
However, the court also emphasised that abuse of the execution process “is 
offensive to the attainment of one or both of the social values”.128 For example, 
there is a strong possibility of abuse if execution is sought for a relatively trifling 
judgment debt,129 because
113 the Fraser case (n 20) par 1.
114 the Fraser case (n 20) par 2. 
115 the Fraser case (n 20) par 16.
116 the Fraser case (n 20) par 17.
117 the Fraser case (n 20) par 17.
118 the Fraser case (n 20) par 17.
119 the Fraser case (n 20) par 17.
120 the Fraser case (n 20) par 18.
121 ibid. For instance, see s 39 of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959; s 37 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 
32 of 1944 and s 86(2) of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936.
122 the Fraser case (n 20) par 19, with reference to the Jaftha case (n 2) par 51.
123 the Fraser case (n 20) par 20.
124 the Fraser case (n 20) par 20.
125 the Fraser case (n 20) par 21.
126 the Fraser case (n 20) par 21. 
127 the Fraser case (n 20) par 22.
128 the Fraser case (n 20) par 22.
129 ibid, with reference to the Jaftha case (n 2).
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“[a] person is dispossessed of the security of residential tenure and a drastic price is paid by the 
judgment debtor for no corresponding benefit to the judgment creditor. The claim to satisfaction 
of the judgment debt might easily have been satisfied other than by resort to the drastic procedure 
of execution against the residential home. In such a case the social value of ensuring a debt is paid 
could easily be met without dispossession of the judgment debtor of the residential property. In such 
a case, the execution against the immovable property would be unjustifiable …”
130
Consequently, the purpose of judicial oversight is to “act as a filter or check on 
execution that does not serve the social interests and which is an abuse” and courts 
must “safeguard against abuse of the execution process”.131 The court placed the 
abuse-of-process guideline at the centre when determining whether declaring a 
home executable is constitutionally justifiable.132 However, it cannot normally be 
said that there is abuse just because a creditor seeks to execute against the debtor’s 
hypothecated home.133 Accordingly, if there is no indication of abuse, the court will 
have no reason to be more vigilant and execution will be allowed.134
3.4.2  Criticism by the Fraser court against the Ntsane decision
According to the Fraser case, when deciding whether execution is justified, the 
court must consider the size of the full outstanding debt, since this is the amount 
that the debtor owes when the creditor invokes the acceleration clause.135 The full 
outstanding balance is therefore more important than the size of the actual sum 
in arrears, which triggered the creditor’s right to accelerate repayment of the 
balance.136 Because the two amounts are conceptually different, they must not be 
confused.137 The court criticised the Ntsane case’s focus on the arrears, which in 
that case was only R18.46 but which resulted in the acceleration of the full balance 
of R62 042.43.138 The Fraser court accepted that selling immovable property in 
execution of a “paltry” judgment debt of R18.46 is not justifiable,139 but whether it 
is justifiable to execute against the same property for a debt of R62 042.43 is not an 
“easy, clear or straightforward” matter.140
The court distinguished between two rights that mortgage bonds grant. First, upon 
default the creditor can accelerate repayment of the full outstanding debt. Secondly, 
the creditor has a procedural right to execute this claim against the mortgaged 
property.141 The court held that section 26(3) applies to the execution stage and not 
to the acceleration stage.142 The Fraser case acknowledged the court’s discretion 
to refuse to declare a house executable if enforcement thereof would culminate in 
an abuse of the process.143 Notwithstanding, the court rejected the approach that 
was taken in the Ntsane case to deny the creditor’s contractual claim to payment 
130 the Fraser case (n 20) par 22.
131 the Fraser case (n 20) par 24.
132 the Fraser case (n 20) par 24.
133 the Fraser case (n 20) par 27.
134 ibid, with reference to the Jaftha case (n 2) par 58.
135 the Fraser case (n 20) par 28.
136 the Fraser case (n 20) par 28.
137 the Fraser case (n 20) par 28.
138 the Fraser case (n 20) par 29. 
139 the Fraser case (n 20) par 31.
140 the Fraser case (n 20) par 31.
141 the Fraser case (n 20) par 32.
142 the Fraser case (n 20) par 32.
143 the Fraser case (n 20) par 33.
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of the outstanding balance.144 Therefore, the Fraser court could not accept that 
the constitutional principle of judicial oversight (and its goal to prevent abuses) 
grants courts the power to redefine the creditor’s contractual entitlement to obtain 
a judgment order for the accelerated outstanding debt, and where execution of this 
redefined debt against the immovable property would be seen as unconscionable 
abuse.145
According to the Fraser case, the Ntsane case approach was based on a “first 
premise”, namely that the arrears is relatively insignificant and therefore in itself 
this amount does not justify execution against immovable property.146 The “second 
premise” is that acceleration leads to a claim for an outstanding balance that is a 
significantly larger amount – large enough to justify execution against the house, 
rendering enforcement not abusive.147 The Fraser case considered the “first premise” 
to be incorrect because to do the section 26(3) enquiry, the creditor’s lawful right of 
acceleration is ignored.148
The correct approach, in the Fraser court’s view, is to separate the matter into two 
enquiries. First, the court must determine the amount to which the creditor is entitled 
in terms of the contract.149 This investigation into contractual rights is independent 
of the second question, namely whether execution against the home is justifiable.150 
The court understood the common law principle to be that a creditor can enforce its 
right of acceleration even if the amount of the actual default is relatively small or 
subsequently purged.151
Therefore, the court held that when a creditor seeks a judgment order as well as 
an execution order and if the accelerated balance is substantial enough to justify 
an execution order against the home, there is no scope to deny the creditor’s right 
of acceleration just because the actual sum in arrears is relatively small.152 More 
specifically, the court found that, in view of the purpose of judicial oversight, it 
cannot interfere with a creditor’s contractual right of acceleration but only with the 
right to execute the accelerated debt against the immovable property.153
The court concluded that although intervention regarding the enforcement of 
acceleration clauses might be called for, it is the function of the legislature and not 
the court.154 In this respect the court commented that the National Credit Act now 
provides a solution that was not available when the Ntsane case was decided,155 
implying that courts would not have to make decisions like the Ntsane case 
again.156
144 the Fraser case (n 20) par 34.
145 the Fraser case (n 20) par 35.
146 the Fraser case (n 20) par 35.
147 the Fraser case (n 20) par 35.
148 ibid. Van Heerden (n 9) 655 seems to favour this approach and agrees that the focus on the amount in 
arrears is incorrect because it ignores the importance of acceleration clauses.
149 the Fraser case (n 20) par 36.
150 This manner of reasoning reminds one of the formalistic distinction that the high court made in the 
Jaftha a quo case (n 19) between sale in execution and eviction. See n 19 above.
151 the Fraser case (n 20) par 36.
152 the Fraser case (n 20) par 36.
153 the Fraser case (n 20) par 37. 
154 the Fraser case (n 20) par 38.
155 the Fraser case (n 20) par 39.
156 In this respect the court was correct, as we extrapolate in section 4.2 below.
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3.4.3  Remarks
The result in the Ntsane case was that the court found that the creditor’s exercise of 
its contractual right to accelerate payment of the outstanding balance was abusive, 
since it would culminate in an unconstitutional limitation of the debtors’ section 
26(1) rights. Therefore, the court overturned the bank’s decision to foreclose. 
Although the court initially stated that the election to accelerate cannot easily be 
regarded as unlawful, it appears that even though the acceleration clause remains 
lawful, the decision to make use of the right can be condemned as unlawful if the 
result would be disproportionate, abusive and/or unconstitutional.
Conversely, the Fraser case followed the position that the exercise of the valid 
contractual right to accelerate repayment should not be interfered with, although 
the procedural right of execution against property may be checked in terms of 
constitutional housing principles. Therefore, a creditor can be accused of abusing 
the execution process, but it cannot be accused of abusing the contractual right of 
acceleration. Its election to accelerate repayment of the debt is absolute and will go 
unchecked, despite the disproportionate results it may have.
However, we do not believe that the Fraser court’s stance in this regard is 
constitutionally sustainable. A formalistic division between the granting of the 
judgment order and the granting of an execution order will defeat the purposes of 
the housing clause. Furthermore, Fraser’s view that the common law principles 
of acceleration cannot be developed by a court is incorrect, since the constitution 
commands courts to develop the common law so as to promote the spirit, purport 
and objects of the bill of rights.157 The enforcement of an acceleration clause 
simply cannot be upheld if, under the circumstances, it results in an unjustifiable 
violation of section 26(1) rights. As the constitutional court held in the Gundwana 
case, by agreeing to the registration of a mortgage bond the debtor does not waive 
the protection he enjoys under the housing clause.158 Therefore, it is not valid to 
argue that the proportionality test does not apply if the debtor agreed to subject his 
home to the possibility of execution. The Gundwana case has the effect that such a 
possibility of foreclosure, which would lead to the sale of the home, is qualified by 
the proportionality standard as required by sections 26(1) and 36(1). Also, despite 
the voluntary burdening of the home, execution may still only occur after all relevant 
circumstances have been considered (section 26(3)), and it would be hard to argue 
that the size of the actual amount in arrears is not relevant to this enquiry.
If the Ntsane case had followed the approach that the Fraser case supported, it 
would have granted judgment for the balance of the outstanding debt and issued 
an execution order. The result would have been a limitation of the debtors’ right 
of “access to adequate housing” that does not satisfy the justification test under 
section 36(1). Not considering the arrears of R18.46 cannot be a sustainable position, 
since it would imply disregarding a relevant circumstantial factor in contravention 
of section 26(3). One cannot call it a legitimate exercise of the rights under the 
acceleration clause if the creditor were to accelerate repayment (or persist with the 
claim) if the arrears is (or is brought down to) an amount that is disproportionate to 
the effect that execution would have on the debtors.
This is not to say that courts should always review and overturn creditors’ election 
to accelerate repayment, since it is possible still to grant judgment for the accelerated 
157 s 39(2). See Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security (Centre for Applied Legal Studies 
Intervening) 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) par 36 and 39.
158 the Gundwana case (n 8) par 44 and 47-48.
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outstanding debt but, because of the small size of the arrears, not to grant a direct 
execution order against the house. Hence, the size of the arrears does not necessarily 
have to influence the lawfulness of acceleration but it can, notwithstanding valid 
acceleration, still determine the justification for granting a direct execution order. 
Much will depend on the facts of each case and the outcome of the proportionality 
test.
Therefore, we argue that a better approach lies somewhere between the ones taken 
in the Ntsane and Fraser cases, combined with the provisions of the National Credit 
Act. The Act and its debt relief mechanisms were not available when the Ntsane 
case was decided and the route that Bertelsmann J took in that case was, in our 
view, the correct one. However, in view of the National Credit Act, we would now 
support – in cases like the Ntsane case – granting of judgment for the accelerated 
outstanding debt, but postponing the execution order to allow the debtor to make 
use of the right to reinstate the mortgage agreement by getting the arrears up to 
date.159 If the sum in arrears is “trifling”, reinstating the agreement should generally 
not be difficult. Nevertheless, this approach should only be followed if debt review 
and debt rearrangement are no longer options. Under the National Credit Act, the 
perfect solution for situations like the Ntsane case would be to refer the matter for 
debt counselling.160 If the sum in arrears is “trifling”, there is a strong likelihood 
that rearranging the debtor’s obligations will be feasible. These National Credit Act 
options are available despite the fact that the creditor relies on a valid acceleration 
clause. Therefore, it is not necessary to develop the common law on this point, 
since the National Credit Act already introduces exceptions to the principles 
surrounding acceleration clauses, which – if properly applied – will avoid the 
unconstitutional effects that would have ensued otherwise. In the next section of the 
article we elaborate on the subsidiarity relationship between the common law, the 
proportionality standard of section 26 and the National Credit Act.
[to be concluded]
WILFUL BLINDNESS MAY CONSTITUTE RECKLESSNESS AND MAY THUS SUPPLY THE 
NECESSARY ELEMENT OF MORAL FAULT
“The trial judge concluded that Violet’s actions in processing the loan in the knowledge of the various 
factors to which his Honour had referred were deliberate and were attended by moral fault and lack 
of moral responsibility. Violet had turned a ‘blind eye’ to the irregularities in the loan application 
and the income declaration and had ensured that the supplementary information was massaged. The 
appeal judges said that given that wilful blindness may constitute recklessness and may thus supply 
the necessary element of moral fault in cases of this kind, they saw no error in his Honour’s approach” 
Young’s discussion of Violet Home Loans Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd 2013 VSCA 56 in 
2013 ALJ 381 382.
159 s 129(3)-(4) of the National Credit Act .
160 s 85 of the National Credit Act. See section 4.3 below – to published in 2014:3 TSAR.
       
